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Statement of Issues and Standards of Review 
Gilbert Development Corporation raises two issues on appeal: (i) whether the trial 
court erred in entering partial directed verdict on Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim; and (ii) whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to 
Wardley Corporation, Don Grymes, Terry LoCicero, Lloyd Melling, and Chad Riddle 
(collectively "Wardley" or "Wardley defendants") as the prevailing parties. 
I. 
On the first issue, the jury considered and rejected an element of the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim when it found on the special verdict form that Gilbert did not impose 
as a condition on the seller-financed transaction that Wright not be "involved" in the 
transaction. Without that condition, there could be no fraudulent nondisclosure of 
Wright's "involvement." The jury also considered and rejected a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim premised on the same duty and the alleged failure of the same defendants to 
disclose the same information as the fraudulent nondisclosure claim. The only difference 
between the fiduciary duty and fraudulent nondisclosure claims is that fraudulent 
nondisclosure requires both additional proof of intent and clear and convincing evidence. 
The jury's rejection of the fiduciary duty claim—and thus rejection of fraudulent 
nondisclosure—is understandable since there is no evidence that the Wardley defendants 
knew Wright was "involved in the seller-financed transaction," as opposed to having a 
previous business relationship with Butterfield. This distinction is important. In the 
middle of trial, Gilbert abandoned his claim that Butterfield was a "straw buyer" and 
Wright was the real buyer. Gilbert instead conceded that only Butterfield purchased the 
property and only Butterfield was obligated under the finance agreement. (R. 2200:160; 
108862^4 1 
2001:76-84, 98, 133; 2206:14-15.) Thus, only Butterfield was "involved in the seller-
financed transaction." 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing a fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim based upon the alleged failure to disclose a person's involvement in a real estate 
transaction, where there was no clear and convincing evidence that (i) the person was 
involved in the seller-financed transaction at issue, instead of a prior cash transaction that 
failed; (ii) defendants were aware of the person's involvement in the transaction at issue; 
(iii) the person's involvement with the buyer was material, or understood to be material, 
by the defendants; or (iv) any defendant acted with intent to deceive. 
Harmless Error: Even if the trial court erred in entering partial directed verdict, 
the error was harmless because (i) the jury found that Gilbert did not impose a condition 
concerning Wright's "involvement" on the seller-financed transaction and (ii) the jury 
rejected an identical breach of fiduciary duty claim involving the same duty, same factual 
allegations, and the same legal elements. Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 
482, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (partial directed verdict harmless error). 
Alternative Grounds to Affirm: Whether a fraudulent nondisclosure claim 
involving the sale of real estate fails as a matter of law where (i) the seller benefited from 
the alleged nondisclosure when he resold the property at a higher price and kept more 
than $600,000 in payments from the original buyer; and (ii) the seller's claimed 
consequential damages of "nearly $600,000 in legal fees" in defending a subsequent 
"frivolous" complaint filed by a California bankruptcy trustee were not a reasonably 
foreseeable result of the nondisclosure. Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, T[ 10, 52 P.3d 
1158 (courts may affirm on "any legal ground or theory apparent on the record"). 
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II. 
With the second issue, Gilbert challenges the amount of attorney fees awarded by 
the trial court. The opening brief fails to mention that, until Wardley prevailed at trial, 
Gilbert advanced the interpretation of the attorney fees provision he rejects on appeal. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the amount of 
attorney fees reasonable, where that finding was based upon nearly 100 pages of evidence 
that the fees were incurred in defending claims encompassed by the fee provision and 
was consistent with both parties' interpretation of the attorney fees provision. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a reasonableness finding for "clear 
abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Utah 1988). 
Failure to Marshal: Gilbert failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding. This court may refuse to consider a challenge to a finding that attorney 
fees were reasonably incurred where the challenging party fails to marshal evidence in 
support. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201,1j 60, 71 P.3d 188. 
Sub-Issues 
Because Gilbert failed to marshal evidence, Wardley alternatively construes the 
sub-issues as contending the attorney fees award was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Sub-Issue 2a: Whether attorney fees incurred in preparing an initially 
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment are perse unreasonable, where the non-
moving party (i) later agrees to dismiss claims on the same ground articulated in the 
motion and (ii) previously interpreted the fee provision to permit recovery of all fees. 
Sub-Issue 2b: Whether attorney fees at discounted Salt Lake City rates incurred 
for a trial held in St. George are perse unreasonable where both parties interpreted the 
108862^4 3 
provision to permit recovery of fees at Salt Lake City rates, both parties retained Salt 
Lake City counsel, the non-prevailing party filed the lawsuit in Salt Lake County, and a 
St. George trial court expressly found that the expertise of Salt Lake counsel made the 
rates reasonable. 
Sub-Issue 2c: Whether attorney fees incurred when a new law firm discusses 
issues with a former law firm are perse unreasonable, where there is no evidence of 
duplication, but is evidence that fees were discounted for transitions involving counsel. 
Sub-Issue 2d: Whether attorney fees incurred in conducting a single mock trial in 
a lawsuit in which $6 million is sought are perse unreasonable. 
Sub-Issue 2e: Whether a party may contend on appeal that some of its claims are 
not subject to an attorney fee provision after it represented in the trial court, and at times 
in the opening brief, that fees associated with all claims are subject to that provision. 
Alternative Sub-Issue 2e: Whether attorney fees incurred in defense of 
claims not subject to an attorney fee provision are perse unreasonable where the 
prevailing party provides evidence that defense of the various claims cannot be separated 
and the non-prevailing party provides no evidence to the contrary. 
Determinative Provisions 
All are attached to the opening brief 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case 
This case involves the sale of a large tract of real property in LaVerkin, Utah. In 
2000, Gilbert owned the property and entered into a real estate purchase contract and 
seller-finance agreement with Henry Butterfield, who agreed to purchase the property for 
$1.6 million. Under the terms of the agreements, Butterfield paid Gilbert a $100,000 
initial deposit, $400,000 at closing, and $138,608.05 during the year before Butterfield 
defaulted on the finance agreement and declared bankruptcy in California. (Tr. Ex. 36.) 
In the California bankruptcy, Gilbert retained the right both to foreclose on the 
property and to keep the $638,608.05 Butterfield had paid Gilbert. Gilbert then sold the 
property to another buyer for $1,644,473.68, which is $44,473.68 more than the contract 
price with Butterfield. In other words, as a result of Butterfield's breach of the seller-
finance agreement, Gilbert profited by $683,081.73 when he both resold the property at a 
higher price and kept the $638,608.05 Butterfield paid him. 
In this lawsuit, Gilbert alleges, under various legal theories, that Wardley's broker 
and agents failed to inform Gilbert that a person he did not like, Dave Wright, was 
"Involved" in the seller-financed transaction between Butterfield and Gilbert. Ultimately, 
(i) the trial court entered partial directed verdict on Gilbert's fraud claims and prayer for 
punitive damages, (ii) the jury rejected Gilbert's remaining claims, and (iii) the trial court 
awarded Wardley attorney fees as the prevailing party. 
This appeal involves (i) whether the trial court erred in entering partial directed 
verdict on Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim, and (ii) whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in the amount of attorney fees it awarded Wardley. 
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II. Course of the Proceedings 
On April 10, 2003, the Salt Lake City office of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker filed this 
lawsuit on behalf of Gilbert in Salt Lake County. (R. 1.) The complaint sets forth claims 
for (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of fiduciary duty; (iii) breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; (iv) fraud/fraudulent nondisclosure/misrepresentation; 
(v) conspiracy to commit fraud; (vi) negligent misrepresentation; (vii) collusive tort; 
(viii) aiding and abetting fraud; (ix) negligence; (x) declaratory judgment, and (xi) quiet 
title. (R. 1-31.) Importantly, with the first 8 claims—which involved Wardley—Gilbert 
sought the same damages arising from the same alleged conduct. (R. 15-30, fflf 68, 77, 
82, 88, 95, 101, 106, 111.) In total, Gilbert sought more than $6 million. (R. 2152.) 
On May 1, 2003, the defendants moved to change venue to Washington County. 
(R. 102, 133, 165.) Ultimately, Gilbert stipulated to the change of venue. (R. 167.) 
Once in Washington County, various defendants were dismissed until only the Wardley 
defendants remained by the time of trial. (R. 222, 425, 945, 1571.) 
In 2005, Wardley moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: 
(i) Gilbert could not prove proximate cause and is not entitled to consequential damages 
because any losses stemming from a California bankruptcy trustee's later filing what 
Gilbert described as "frivolous" claims were not the reasonably foreseeable result of 
Wardley's alleged failure to disclose Wright's "involvement" with the transaction; and 
(ii) Gilbert's claims of "collusive tort" and "aiding and abetting fraud" are not recognized 
under Utah law. (R. 1125-28.) While the trial court denied the motion, it stated that 
Wardley's arguments were "strong" and explained, "appellate courts have consistently 
reversed far more summary judgment decisions than they have affirmed." (R. 1625-27.) 
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Just before trial, Gilbert agreed to dismiss his claims for (i) negligent 
misrepresentation, (ii) negligence, (iii) aiding and abetting fraud, and (iv) collusive tort. 
(R. 2207:48-49, 87.) Gilbert agreed to dismiss the collusive tort and aiding and abetting 
fraud claims after the trial court stated that they are not recognized causes of action under 
Utah law—the same argument Wardley advanced in its summary judgment papers.1 
(R. 1125-28; 2207:48-49, 87.) Therefore, even though the motion for summary judgment 
was not granted, arguments made in support of that motion ultimately were successful. 
By the time of trial, the remaining claims included: (i) breach of contract; 
(ii) breach of fiduciary duty; (iii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
(iv) fraud/fraudulent nondisclosure/misrepresentation; and (v) conspiracy to commit 
fraud. All of these claims were premised upon Gilbert having imposed a condition that 
Wright could not be involved with a seller-financed transaction. (R. 2200:11-14, 40.) 
Throughout this lawsuit, including trial, Gilbert maintained that all of his claims 
were both based upon contract and premised upon Gilbert's imposing a condition that 
Wright could not be "involved" in a seller-financed transaction.2 (R. 2204:213, 241.) 
Gilbert stipulated that the following question on the special verdict form would be 
dispositive of all claims, including a tort claim, because it determined whether Gilbert 
imposed such a condition: "Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that [Gilbert] 
imposed, under the terms of any agreement in sufficiently definite terms a condition that 
[Gilbert] would not seller-finance the sale of [the property] to anyone if Dave Wright. . . 
were involved in the transaction in any way, shape or form?" (R. 1890.) 
1
 Wardley cannot locate a record cite for the dismissal of the collusive tort claim. 
2
 "With respect to the tort and fraud claims, many of the same facts and testimony and 
arguments relating to the contract claims related to the tort claims." (R. 2204:213.) 
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After the close of evidence, the trial court granted partial directed verdict on 
Gilbert's fraud and conspiracy claims and prayer for punitive damages. (R. 2204:228.) 
In closing, Gilbert then abandoned his theory that Wardley had failed to disclose that 
Wright was the "real" buyer and Butterfield a "straw buyer," presumably because Gilbert 
had to concede during trial that only Butterfield purchased the property and was obligated 
under the finance agreement. (R. 2200:12; 2206:13-16; 2200:160; 2001:76-84, 98, 133.) 
After closing arguments, the jury answered "no" to the first question on the special 
verdict form and thereby rejected all of Gilbert's claims. (R. 1890.) Gilbert has not 
appealed any issues related to the special verdict form, and yet ignores the jury's finding 
and asserts on appeal that Gilbert did communicate in "sufficiently definite terms" a 
condition that Wright not be "involved" in a seller-financed transaction. Otherwise, 
Gilbert appeals only that part of the partial directed verdict dismissing his fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim—which includes the same elements, and is based upon the same 
factual allegations, as the fiduciary duty claim rejected by the jury. (AOB at 17.) 
After Wardley prevailed at trial, it requested its attorney fees and costs. (R. 1897, 
1927.) In support, Wardley pointed out that (i) Gilbert had previously interpreted the 
attorney fees provision as entitling the prevailing party to all fees, at Salt Lake City rates, 
regardless of whether the fees were incurred in advancing successful positions; and 
(ii) by April 2006—two years before trial—Gilbert sought his entire $275,150 in attorney 
fees under the attorney-fee provision. (R. 1941.) After two more years of litigation, a 
six-day trial, and post-trial motions, the trial court awarded Wardley $397,911 in attorney 
fees—only $122,761 more than Gilbert had incurred by 2006. (R. 2164.) Gilbert appeals 
only the amount of attorney fees, not Wardley's entitlement to fees as prevailing party. 
10886234 8 
III. Statement of Facts 
In July 1999, Gilbert retained Wardley agents Karen Fuller and Terry LoCicero to 
sell real property located in LaVerkin, Utah. (R. 2200:114.) Butterfield later retained 
Wardley agents Chad Riddle and Lloyd Melling to represent him in buying the property. 
(R. 2202:147-48.) Wardley broker Don Grymes served as the broker. (R. 2200:119.) 
Gilbert initially entered into a real estate purchase contract to sell the property to 
Butterfield for $1.2 million in a cash deal. (AOB at 6; R. 2200:140-41.) That contract 
lapsed. After further negotiations, Gilbert and Butterfield entered into a second real 
estate purchase contract in which Gilbert agreed to sell the property for $1.6 million, and 
seller finance the purchase, if Butterfield paid $500,000 in cash by the time of closing, 
which Butterfield did. (AOB at 6.) After Butterfield made 6 payments totaling 
$138,608.05, both he and his company, Mobile Mansions, declared bankruptcy in 
California. Gilbert claims to have spent "nearly $600,000 in legal fees" in California, but 
ultimately not only retained the $638,608.05 Butterfield had paid him but also reacquired 
title and resold the property for $1,644,473.68. (AOB at 11, 12.) 
A. Facts Relevant to the Partial Directed Verdict on Gilbert's Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure Claim 
The following facts are relevant to the trial court's partial directed verdict on 
Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. In the opening brief, Gilbert states that he 
would not have sold the property to, nor seller-financed the transaction with, Butterfield 
had he known Dave Wright was "involved." (AOB at 27.) Although one would never 
know from reading the opening brief, much of the trial concerned what Gilbert meant, 
and was understood to mean, by the term "involved." While Wardley will set forth the 
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facts in the light most favorable to Gilbert, Wardley reminds the court that information— 
here, Wright's "involvement"—is material only if it is "something which a buyer or seller 
of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of importance in determining 
whether to buy or sell." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, fflf 32-33, 143 
P.3d 283 (deleting word "some" from definition of "material"). Thus, evidence of what 
information was material must be viewed through an objective, not a subjective, lens. 
1. The Two Meanings of "Involved" 
Gilbert testified that he meant "involved" in a seller-financed transaction in the 
broadest sense of "any way, shape or form," including if "Dave Wright even stepped foot 
on the property," or Wright "was on there pulling weeds." (R. 2001:52, 59, 61-63.) 
Gilbert understood the term so broadly that it would have raised concerns for Gilbert if 
Wright had flown over the property at 30,000 feet. (R. 2001: 78.) Even if "Donald 
Trump" had been the purchaser, Gilbert testified, he would not have seller financed the 
transaction if Wright were "involved" with the development of the property. 
(R. 2001:54-65, 88-89.) Importantly, and despite his contentions at trial, Gilbert 
conceded that he never clarified to the Wardley defendants that he used the term 
"involved" in this extraordinarily broad sense. (R. 2200:160.) 
The other meaning of the term "involved" was a narrower, more natural meaning 
in the context of the real estate transaction: neither Wright nor an entity owned by 
Wright could be the purchaser or obligor under the finance agreement. Consistent with 
this meaning, during opening statements Gilbert's counsel outlined Gilbert's theory that 
Wright was "involved" in the seller-financed transaction because Wright was the "real 
buyer" and Butterfield was a "straw buyer." (R. 2200:12.) Under this definition, Wright 
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could not be the purchaser or obligor, but could, for example, set foot on the property or 
pull weeds on the property or fly over the property. 
The different meanings are important because (i) only the narrow meaning 
satisfies the objective test for materiality; (ii) Gilbert never clarified to the Wardley 
defendants that he meant anything other than the narrow meaning of "involved;" and 
(iii) Gilbert eventually abandoned his theory that Wright was the "real buyer" when he 
was forced to concede that only Butterfield purchased the property and was obligated 
under the finance agreement. (R. 2200:160; 2001:76-84, 98, 133; 2206:13-16.) In other 
words, it is undisputed that Wright was not "involved" in the narrow sense. 
2. The Two Different Transactions 
Not only is there just one meaning of "involved" relevant to the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim, only one transaction is relevant. Most of the evidence cited in the 
opening brief concerns the first, failed transaction in which Butterfield agreed to pay $1.2 
million in a cash deal. (AOB at 6, 28-35; R. 2200:140-41.) The parties signed the real 
estate purchase contract in that first deal in August 1999, and that deal failed when 
Butterfield did not come forward with the purchase price to close the transaction in 
November 1999. (AOB at 6.) At trial, Gilbert conceded that Wright's "involvement"— 
in any sense of that term—was irrelevant with regard to this first transaction because 
Gilbert would have sold the property to Wright himself in a cash deal. (R. 2201:72.) 
On December 13, 1999, at a mediation to determine who had the right to the 
earnest money deposited for the first deal, Gilbert and Butterfield negotiated and signed 
both a new real estate purchase contract for $1.6 million and a seller-financed agreement. 
(Tr. Ex. 36.) It is undisputed that during the negotiations on December 13, 1999, Gilbert 
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was represented by his wife and lawyer, Cyndi Gilbert, and Butterfield was represented 
by his lawyer, Bruce Jenkins, not by Dave Wright. (AOB at 7-8.) It also is undisputed 
that Gilbert did not perform any due diligence on Butterfield because, he testified, he was 
"getting half a million dollars down," which was "[p]retty good insurance." 
(R. 2001:108, 107.) Gilbert explained that "if Butterfield's a deadbeat and defaults, I get 
to keep the money he's paid me down, and I repossess the property." (R. 2001:109-10.) 
In other words, whether Butterfield was solvent (i.e., could make payments) did not 
concern Gilbert because he had $500,000 in security and the right to foreclose. 
Importantly, it is only the seller-financed transaction that Gilbert claims he would 
not have entered into had he known of Wright's "involvement," and therefore, it is only 
Wright's involvement in the seller-financed deal that is at issue. (AOB at 9.) Gilbert's 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim thus not only requires Wright's "involvement" in the 
broad sense somehow to have been a condition of the transaction, but also requires 
evidence concerning such "involvement" in the seller-financed transaction, not in the first 
transaction. Gilbert and Butterfield agreed to the terms of the seller-financed transaction 
on December 13, 1999, and closed that transaction on January 13, 2000. (AOB at 10.) 
3. LoCicero Arguably Understood Gilbert Meant "Involved" in the 
Broadest Sense, but Was Unaware of Wright's "Involvement" 
Gilbert testified that he told his agents—Fuller" and LoCicero—that he did not 
want to seller finance if Wright was "involved." (R. 2200:136.) Gilbert told Fuller and 
LoCicero that he "didn't want to have anything to do with [Wright]." (R. 2202:142-43, 
176-77.) Gilbert testified that he made it clear to LoCicero that Wright could not be 
* Gilbert never filed a claim against Fuller. 
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involved in any way. (R. 2200:135-36; 2201:52-55.) With the facts construed most 
favorably to Gilbert, LoCicero arguably understood that Gilbert subjectively meant 
"involved" in the broadest sense. 
However, LoCicero never met Wright and had no knowledge of any involvement 
of Wright in any way. (R. 2202:148, 150, 182, 186.) As Gilbert points out in the 
opening brief, the only evidence that LoCicero had any knowledge of Wright's 
"involvement" was that Gilbert told LoCicero that he had heard a rumor that Wright was 
involved in the first contract. (AOB at 28.) Of course, LoCicero did not need to tell 
Gilbert about the rumor because Gilbert told her. 
4. Grymes, Riddle, and Melling Understood "Involved" in the 
Natural Sense, But Wright Was Not "Involved" in This Sense 
As for the broker (Grymes) and Butterfield's agents (Riddle and Melling), the only 
evidence is that they understood the prohibition on Wright's "involvement" as 
prohibiting Wright from being the buyer or obligor under the financing agreement—i.e., 
in Gilbert's terminology, Wright could not be the "real buyer" and Butterfield the "straw 
buyer."4 Gilbert testified that he mentioned to Grymes that Wright could not be involved. 
(R. 2001:127.) Fuller testified that she recalled telling Melling that Wright could not be 
'the person on the other end of the deal." (R. 2202:176, 154-56.) Fuller also may have 
told Grymes that Wright should not be involved, but, nine years after the conversation, 
she was "trying to put this together in my head, and I don't know exactly." (R. 2202:157-
58, 162.) And Gilbert testified that he told Grymes that he did not want to do the deal 
4
 Again, Gilbert admits he never clarified what he meant by the term "involved," and the 
jury found that Wright's involvement in the broad sense was not a condition imposed on 
the seller-financed transaction. (R. 2200:160; 1890.) 
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with Wright. (R. 2000:151.) None of this evidence supports an inference beyond the 
natural meaning of "involved" in the context of a real estate transaction. 
Consistent with this, Riddle testified that Gilbert told him he "did not want to deal 
with and did not like" Wright. (R. 2202:16.) Riddle explained that he understood 
"involved" to mean, "He's not the buyer of the con - or he's not the buyer, period, you 
know, so he's not involved. He's not the buyer." (R. 2202:40, 19.) Riddle then 
explained that it would not have occurred to him that if Butterfield "even knew Dave 
Wright" that Gilbert would not have sold the property to Butterfield. (Id.) 
Melling testified that he did not understand the prohibition on Wright's being 
"involved" to mean that if Wright was involved in "any way, shape, or form," then 
Gilbert would not have sold the property to Butterfield. (R. 2202:107-08.) Melling 
understood only that Wright could not be "financially involved with this project and be 
responsible for making payments or anything like that on this." (R. 2202:123.) 
Grymes testified that he did not recall ever being told that Wright could not be 
"involved" and did not know Wright was "involved," even in the broad sense of the term. 
(R. 2201:250-51, 253-59.) And while Riddle and Melling dealt with Wright during the 
failed cash deal, neither agent dealt with Wright during the seller-financed transaction for 
which Butterfield was represented by his own attorney. (R. 2202:38, 70.) 
Thus, there is no evidence that Grymes, Melling, or Riddle understood—or should 
have understood—the term "involved" in the broad sense Gilbert claims he intended; 
indeed, at trial Gilbert admitted he never made that clarification. (R. 2200:160; 1890.) 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Wardley defendants were aware of any 
"involvement" of Wright in the seller-financed transaction. 
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B, Facts Relevant to the Alternative Grounds to Affirm 
The district court also could have entered partial directed verdict on Gilbert's 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim on the following grounds: (i) Gilbert was not harmed by 
the alleged nondisclosures; (ii) the claimed consequential damages were not reasonably 
foreseeable; and (iii) the nondisclosures were not the proximate cause of any claimed 
damages. The facts relevant to these issues are as follows. 
1. Gilbert Benefited From the Alleged Nondisclosures 
Gilbert testified that he did not perform any due diligence on Butterfield because 
he was "getting half a million dollars down" and "if ButterfiekTs a deadbeat and defaults, 
I get to keep the money he's paid me down, and I repossess the property." (R. 2001:108-
10.) Whether Butterfield could make payments was not an issue for Gilbert. 
Gilbert also claims that had he known Wright was "involved" in any way, then he 
would not have entered into the seller-financed transaction. (AOB 27.) In the "but for" 
world of this lawsuit, then, Gilbert does not sell the property to Butterfield. In that world, 
Gilbert continues to pay all property taxes and maintenance costs on the property, is 
entitled to no interest payments or late fees from Butterfield, receives no down payments 
from Butterfield, and must sell the property to another buyer. (R. 2001:10-11.) 
Instead, Gilbert kept $638,608.05 Butterfield paid him and then repossessed and 
resold the property to another buyer for an additional $44,473.68. (Tr. Ex. 36.) In other 
words, Gilbert profited by at least $638,608.05 from the alleged nondisclosure. Even if 
Wardley were legally responsible for the "nearly $600,000" Gilbert spent in attorney fees 
two years later in a California bankruptcy proceeding, Gilbert still benefited from any 
nondisclosures. 
108862M 15 
2. Gilbert's Incurring Attorney Fees in the California Bankruptcy 
Was Neither a Reasonably Foreseeable Result of, nor 
Proximately Caused by, the Alleged Nondisclosures 
After the seller-financed deal closed on January 13, 2000, Butterfield made six 
payments through February 2, 2001. (R. 1196.) On February 28, 2001, Mobile 
Mansions—owned by Butterfield —filed bankruptcy in California. (R. 1198; 2203:12.) 
On June 8, 2001, Butterfield filed bankruptcy in California. (Id.) 
On February 27, 2002, one of the bankruptcy trustees filed a complaint against 
Gilbert that clouded title to the property and sought the return of the money Butterfield 
had paid Gilbert. (R. 1201.) Gilbert claims to have spent "nearly $600,000" in attorney 
fees to maintain his right to foreclose on the property and to retain the money Butterfield 
paid him. (AOB at 12.) Gilbert characterized the trustee's complaint as "frivolous," 
sought leave to file a malicious prosecution claim against the trustee, and, as part of 
Gilbert's settlement with the new trustee, insisted upon being assigned all claims against 
the former trustee. (R. 1354-60.) 
C. Facts Relevant to the Trial Court's Attorney Fees Award 
In the opening brief, Gilbert has not marshaled any evidence in support of the trial 
court's finding that all but $ 1,625 of the attorney fees sought by the Wardley defendants 
were reasonable. (AOB at 13; R. 2153, 2162.) There is, however, evidence relevant to 
the trial court's reasonableness finding, some of which is set forth below. 
All five Gilbert defendants agreed to waive conflicts and be represented by the 
same law firm. (R. 2158.) Had each defendant retained separate counsel, the attorney 
fees award would have been much higher. As some measure of how reasonable 
Wardley's fees were, Gilbert did not submit for comparison the bills of his own counsel, 
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Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. The reason is obvious. By April 2006—two years before 
trial—Gilbert listed his fees as totaling $275,150. (R. 1941.) After two more years of 
litigation, a six-day trial, and post-trial motions, the trial court awarded Wardley 
$397,911 in attorney fees, only $122,761 more than Gilbert's figure in 2006. (R. 2164.) 
In addition to these facts of general relevance to the trial court's reasonableness 
finding, there are also facts relevant to the particular sub-issues raised by Gilbert. With 
the first sub-issue, Gilbert maintains that the attorney fees incurred in preparing an 
unsuccessful motion for summary judgment are unreasonable. Some of the evidence 
relevant to this sub-issue is that (i) Gilbert previously interpreted the attorney fees 
provision as allowing the recovery of all fees; (ii) Gilbert subsequently agreed to dismiss 
two of the claims for the reasons articulated in the summary judgment papers; and 
(iii) the trial court specifically found that the particular summary judgment motion in this 
case was valuable even though it was denied. (R. 1941; 1125-28; 2207:48-49, 87; 2156.) 
With the second sub-issue, Gilbert maintains that Salt Lake City rates are 
unreasonable for a trial held in St. George. Some of the evidence relevant to this sub-
issue is that (i) Gilbert retained the Salt Lake City law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
to file this lawsuit in Salt Lake County; (ii) the Salt Lake City office of Stoel Rives is one 
of two firms representing Gilbert on appeal; and (iii) Gilbert previously interpreted the 
fee provision as sanctioning his recovery of ah of his fees. (R. 1; 1941.) 
With the third sub-issue, Gilbert maintains that $2,632.50 in attorney fees were 
"related to the transition" of counsel from the St. George office of Jones Waldo to the 
Salt Lake City office of Snell & Wilmer. Gilbert's only support is that some unspecified 
fee entries on pages 2020-22 of the record describe discussions between old and new 
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counsel and new counsel's review of documents. (AOB at 46.) Some of the evidence 
relevant to this sub-issue is that counsel for Wardley discounted fee rates and wrote off 
time for things such as turnover in representation. (R. 1996.) 
With the fourth sub-issue, Gilbert maintains that $45,669 allegedly incurred in 
conducting a mock trial were unreasonable. Some of the evidence relevant to this sub-
issue is that (i) the trial court specifically rejected Gilbert's $45,669 figure based on its 
review of the time entries in the record; (ii) other entries with the phrase iwmock trial" 
describe work such as preparing exhibits later used for trial; and (iii) the mock trial was 
valuable in this case because the issues were complex and Gilbert sought more than $6 
million in damages. (R. 2157.) 
With the fifth sub-issue, Gilbert maintains that Wardley failed to allocate fees 
associated with claims subject to the attorney fee provision and fees associated with 
claims not subject to that provision, the latter presumably being tort claims. Some of the 
evidence relevant to this sub-issue is that (i) Gilbert rejected this position in the trial court 
and rejects it at times in the opening brief (he argues that if he prevails on the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim then he is the prevailing party under the contract provision); and 
(ii) Wardley provided evidence that it is not possible to separate fees incurred in defense 
of the contract claims from fees incurred in defense of the tort claims because all claims 
were premised upon the same conduct and duties. (AOB at 36; R. 1952, 1994.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
This court can affirm the dismissal of Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim on 
six separate grounds. First, the jury considered and rejected the factual predicate to all of 
Gilbert's claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, when the jury found that Gilbert did 
not impose a condition that Wright could not be involved in a seller-financed transaction. 
Second, because Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim is subsumed by his 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, when the jury rejected the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
it necessarily rejected the fraudulent nondisclosure claim. The fraudulent nondisclosure 
claim required clear and convincing evidence that Wardley (i) had an intent to defraud, 
(ii) had a legal duty to disclose material information, (iii) knew of that information, and 
(iv) failed to disclose that information. (AOB at 17.) The breach of fiduciary duty claim 
required a preponderance of the evidence that Wardley (i) had a duty to disclose material 
information, and (ii) had knowledge of that information, and (iii) failed to disclose that 
information. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, Tfi| 18-22, 48 P.3d 235. Because here 
the duties and undisclosed information are identical, the jury verdict would have been the 
same had the trial court not entered partial directed verdict. Any error was harmless. 
Third, the test for whether information is material under Utah law is whether a 
reasonable person would consider the information material. Here, the only information 
that arguably qualifies as material would be if Wright had been the "real" buyer or 
obligor, a theory Gilbert advanced during opening statements but abandoned during trial. 
It is now undisputed that Wright was not the buyer or obligor, and therefore, there was no 
material information concerning Wright's involvement to disclose. 
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Fourth, in the opening brief Gilbert impermissibly combines (i) the duties of 
certain Wardley defendants with the information known by other Wardley defendants, 
and (ii) information related to two different transactions, even through only one seller-
financed transaction is at issue here. Only one Wardley defendant—LoCicero—believed 
Gilbert considered any "involvement" by Wright to be material, but LoCicero knew 
nothing about Wright. The other Wardley defendants—Grymes, Melling, and Riddle— 
arguably knew Wright had a relationship with Butterfield during the first transaction, but 
they not only had no duty to disclose that information, but also, quite reasonably, did not 
consider that relationship to constitute Wright's being "involved" in the seller-financed 
transaction. Moreover, evidence concerning the first, cash deal is irrelevant because 
Gilbert conceded that he would have sold the property to Wright himself in a cash deal. 
Fifth, partial directed verdict was appropriate because Gilbert suffered no 
damages. Gilbert agreed to seller finance the sale of the property to Butterfield for $1.6 
million. Before Butterfield declared bankruptcy, Butterfield paid Gilbert $638,608.05. 
Gilbert foreclosed on the property and subsequently sold it to another buyer for 
$1,644,608.68. Thus, Gilbert profited by at least $638,608.05. And even if Gilbert spent 
"nearly $600,000 in legal fees" in bankruptcy proceedings defending what he describes 
as "frivolous" claims, Gilbert still profited from any nondisclosure. (AOB at 12.) 
Finally, Gilbert could not recover damages on his fraudulent nondisclosure claim 
because his incurring fees in defending against what he described as "frivolous" claims in 
a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding was not a reasonably foreseeable result of Wardley's 
failing to disclose anything concerning Wright. Thus, Gilbert's claimed consequential 
damages are not recoverable, and Gilbert could not establish proximate cause. 
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With the second issue, Gilbert argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
the amount of attorney fees it awarded Wardley as prevailing party. The court should 
decline to address these arguments because Gilbert failed to marshal any evidence 
supporting the trial court's reasonableness findings. If the court chooses to address the 
arguments, it should reject them, especially to the extent they are pure legal challenges. 
First, Gilbert argues that fees spent on temporarily unsuccessful arguments in a 
motion for summary judgment are per se unreasonable, even where, as here, the non-
moving party later agrees to dismiss claims for the reasons articulated in the summary 
judgment papers. This court should not adopt the suggested per se rule. 
Second, Gilbert argues that the contractual attorney fees provision contemplates 
St. George rates for attorney fees. Gilbert fails to mention that he took the opposite 
position when his Salt Lake City counsel's attorney fees were in play. This court should 
reject Gilbert's new position, which would prohibit St. George trial judges from finding it 
reasonable for St. George clients to hire Salt Lake City counsel with an expertise. If Salt 
Lake City rates are per se unreasonable, then St. George residents must forfeit the ability 
to hire counsel with the expertise their case requires or to recover their attorney fees. 
Third, Gilbert argues that attorney fees incurred in transitioning counsel are per se 
unreasonable. In making this argument, Gilbert fails to identify which time entries he 
considers objectionable and, more important, fails to marshal any evidence in support of 
the court's reasonableness finding. Wardley provided evidence that its counsel 
discounted fees for transitioning counsel, which is sufficient support for the trial court's 
finding. 
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Fourth, Gilbert argues that attorney fees incurred in a single mock trial to prepare 
to defend against $6 million in claims are per se unreasonable. Gilbert does not cite a 
single Utah case, or marshal any evidence, in advancing this argument. Moreover, 
Gilbert provides no support for his assertion that Wardley incurred $45,669 in fees 
associated with the mock trial, an assertion the trial court expressly rejected after 
reviewing hundreds of time entries. In fact, most of the fees Wardley incurred were for 
things such as preparing exhibits and developing strategies that were also used at trial. 
Finally, Gilbert argues that Wardley failed to apportion attorney fees incurred in 
defending tort claims, which Gilbert asserts are not recoverable under the contract. In the 
trial court, Gilbert asserted that he was entitled to all attorney fees under the same 
contract provision. (R. 1941.) And on appeal, Gilbert asserts that if this court reverses 
the fraudulent nondisclosure claim (a tort claim), then Wardley will no longer be the 
prevailing party for purposes of the attorney fees provision, a position that assumes that 
provision encompasses tort claims. (AOB at 36.) Gilbert cannot interpret the provision 
differently simply because he was not the prevailing party. Regardless, Wardley 
provided evidence that defense of the different claims is inseparable, something Gilbert's 
prior counsel acknowledged during trial. 
For all of these reasons, this court should (i) affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
the fraudulent nondisclosure claim; (ii) affirm the trial court's finding that the amount of 
Wardley's attorney fees was reasonable; (iii) award Wardley its attorney fees on appeal 
as the prevailing party; and (iv) remand to permit the trial court to supplement the 
judgment against Gilbert with Wardley's reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
10886234 22 
Argument 
The opening brief is remarkable for what it omits. Gilbert first contends that the 
trial court erred in entering partial directed verdict on his fraudulent nondisclosure claim. 
Gilbert does not mention that on the special verdict form the jury found that Gilbert did 
not impose a condition on the seller-financed transaction that Wright not be "involved," 
the very condition Gilbert cites as supporting his fraudulent nondisclosure claim. Gilbert 
also does not disclose that the jury considered and rejected a breach of fiduciary duty 
claim involving the same duties and same factual allegations as the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim. And Gilbert omits that the test for whether Wright's "involvement" 
was material is an objective, not a subjective, test. Under the objective test, Wright's 
"involvement" meant Wright was the buyer or obligor under the finance agreement, and, 
by the end of trial, Gilbert had conceded that Wright was neither. As demonstrated 
below, these considerations, and others, provide this court a number of reasons to affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. 
Gilbert next contends that the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court 
was unreasonable. Gilbert omits, and therefore fails to marshal, any evidence in support 
of the trial courf s reasonableness finding. Gilbert also does not mention that he 
advances positions inconsistent with his previous positions. In the trial court, Gilbert 
asserted that all of his counsel's fees were recoverable at Salt Lake City rates. The 
provision cannot mean something different simply because Gilbert did not prevail. As 
demonstrated below, the court should affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees and 
award Wardley its attorney fees on appeal as the prevailing party. 
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I. This Court Should Affirm the Trial Court's Dismissal of Gilbert's Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure Claim on a Number of Grounds 
This court can affirm the trial court's dismissal of Gilbert's fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim on a number of different grounds, which are set forth below. 
A. Any Error Concerning the Partial Directed Verdict Was Harmless 
Because the Same Elements and Facts Were Considered by the Jury 
When It Rejected the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
Even though the trial court entered partial directed verdict on the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim, the jury nonetheless rejected an element of that claim when it found 
that Gilbert did not impose a condition on the seller-financed transaction that Wright 
could not be "involved." (Addendum B.) That alleged condition is the factual predicate 
to all of Gilbert's claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure. The elements of fraudulent 
nondisclosure include: "(1) that the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a 
legal duty to communicate." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, ^ [ 10, 143 
P.3d 283. Information about Wright's involvement was not material, and the Wardley 
defendants thus had no duty to disclose it, if Gilbert never imposed the condition that 
Wright could not be involved in the seller-financed transaction. (AOB at 20.) 
Acknowledging this, Gilbert stipulated to a special verdict form with the following 
dispositive question: "Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that [Gilbert] 
imposed, under the terms of any agreement, in sufficiently definite terms a condition that 
[Gilbert] would not seller-finance the sale of [the property] to anyone if Dave Wright... 
were involved in the transaction in any way, shape or form?" (R. 2204:281; 2206:19; 
1890; Addendum B.) Because information concerning Wright's ''involvement" had to be 
a communicated condition of the transaction to support the fraudulent nondisclosure 
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claim, the jury rejected the fraudulent nondisclosure claim when it answered "no" to this 
question on the special verdict form.5 (R. 1890.) 
Moreover, the jury considered and rejected a breach of fiduciary duty claim that 
was duplicative of the fraudulent nondisclosure claim. Both claims involved the same 
duties and legal elements. To prove fraudulent nondisclosure, Gilbert had to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that each defendant (i) had an intent to defraud, (ii) had a 
legal duty to communicate material information to Gilbert, (iii) had knowledge of that 
information, and (iv) failed to disclose that information to Gilbert. (AOB at 17.) To 
prove breach of fiduciary duty, Gilbert had to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that each defendant (i) had a duty to disclose material information to Gilbert and 
(ii) had knowledge of that information, and (iii) failed to disclose that information to 
Gilbert. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ffl[ 18-22, 48 P.3d 235. 
Comparing the two causes of action, Gilbert had to prove every element of his 
fiduciary duty claim to prove part of his fraudulent nondisclosure claim. In the trial 
court, Gilbert's counsel recognized the overlap, explaining that the failure to disclose 
Wright's involvement ccwould certainly be a fraudulent omission, and it would certainly 
be a breach of fiduciary duty."6 (R. 2207:47, 111.) The two claims required Gilbert to 
5
 Whether Gilbert should have stipulated to this question as dispositive of his breach of 
fiduciary duty claim is another matter. Gilbert has not, and now cannot, challenge the 
dispositive nature for a tort claim. While a fiduciary duty is distinct from contractual 
duties, Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ^  11, 17, 48 P.3d 235, Gilbert repeatedly 
represented that all claims were based upon contractual duties so he could recover ah of 
his attorney fees under the fee provision. (R. 1646-49; 1941; 2204:213, 341; 2207:47.) 
On appeal, Gilbert represents that his fraudulent nondisclosure claim "arises from" a 
contractual duty when he argues that he could be the prevailing party under the fee 
provision if he prevails only on his fraudulent nondisclosure claim. (AOB at 36-37.) 
There is no question that the fiduciary duty claims were directed at all five Wardley 
defendants. (R. 1891-92.) Whether they should have been is a different matter. 
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establish the same duty, and that the same material information was known to, but not 
disclosed by, each Wardley defendant. Gilbert presented this case to the jury with its 
breach of fiduciary duty claim, and the jury rejected it. (R. 1842, 1871-74, 1890-92.) 
For both reasons, the jury's verdict would not have differed had Gilbert presented 
the same issues in the packaging of "fraudulent nondisclosure.'5 Where a jury's verdict 
would not have differed had partial directed verdict not been granted, this court affirms. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
B. Partial Directed Verdict Was Appropriate Because No Defendant Both 
Knew that Wright's Involvement Was Material and Knew of Wright's 
Involvement and No Defendant Acted with an Intent to Deceive 
Even ignoring that the jury effectively rejected the fraudulent nondisclosure claim, 
the trial court did not err in entering partial directed verdict. Under Utah law, fraud 
claims at the directed verdict stage still must be evaluated under the "clear and 
convincing evidence" standard. Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 
(Utah 1980). Gilbert failed to provide evidence from which a reasonable juror could find 
that (i) Wright's involvement in a seller-financed transaction (assuming there was 
involvement) was material; or (ii) any Wardley defendant knew that Wright was 
"Involved" in the seller-financed transaction or acted with an intent to defraud. 
At the outset, it is important to note that the only transaction at issue is the second, 
seller-financed transaction, not the first, cash deal that never occurred. This is important 
because Gilbert conceded that he would have sold the property to anyone, including 
Wright in a cash deal, so Wright's involvement in that deal is irrelevant. (R. 2201:72.) 
The seller-financed deal was negotiated on December 13, 1999, by ButterfiekTs counsel, 
not by Wright. (AOB at 7-8.) Any information concerning Wright's "involvement 
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therefore must pertain to events after December 13, 1999, and prior to January 13, 2000, 
when the transaction closed. (AOB at 10.) The evidence about Wright cited in the 
opening brief concerns activities before December 13, 1999, and relates to the failed cash 
deal, not the subsequent seller-financed deal at issue here. 
1. The Only "Involvement" Material to the Transaction Would 
Have Been Wright's Being a Buyer or Obligor, and It Is 
Undisputed That Wright Was Neither 
Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim requires that information concerning 
Wright's 'Involvement" in the seller-financed transaction be material. Under Utah law, 
information is material only if it is "something which a buyer or seller of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would think to be of importance in determining whether to buy 
or sell." Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp.. 2006 UT 47, ffl[ 32-33, 143 P.3d 283 
(emphasis added) (deleting "some" from the definition of "material"). "Importance/' in 
turn, is determined by 'the degree to which the information could be expected to 
influence the judgment of a person buying property or assenting to a particular purchase 
price." Id at ]f 34 (emphasis added). In other words, the test for whether information is 
material is an objective test asking what a "seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence 
would think," not what the actual seller subjectively thought.7 
Here, determining what level of Wright's involvement would concern a seller of 
ordinary intelligence and prudence is especially important because Gilbert testified that 
he never clarified what he meant by the term "involved," so how Wright's "involvement" 
7
 That objective understanding of "involved" governs in this case for the additional 
reasons that (i) Gilbert never clarified that he was using "involved" in a very broad 
idiosyncratic sense; and (ii) the jury rejected the notion that Gilbert imposed that broad 
sense of "involved" on the seller-financed transaction. (R. 1890; 2200:160.) 
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would be understood by a reasonable person is the only relevant test. (R. 2200:160.) 
Applying the objective test for materiality, any prohibition on Wright's involvement 
would be material, if at all, only to the extent it meant that Wright could not be the buyer 
or obligor under the seller-finance agreement. Throughout this lawsuit and during 
opening statements, Gilbert's theory was that the Wardley defendants failed to disclose 
that Wright was the "real" buyer and obligor and Butterfield was a "straw buyer." 
(R. 2200:12.) Gilbert was forced to concede during his testimony, however, that only 
Butterfield purchased the property and only Butterfield was obligated under the finance 
agreement. (R. 2200:160; 2001:76-84, 98, 133.) Therefore, by the time of closing 
arguments Gilbert had abandoned his theory that Wright was the "real" buyer and 
obligor. (R. 2206:13-16.) This concession is important because if "involvement" means 
Wright is the real buyer or obligor, then there was no information that Wright was the 
real buyer or obligor for any Wardley defendant to have disclosed. 
In fact, even Wright's being the "real" buyer would not have been a concern for 
Gilbert, as Gilbert testified that in a cash transaction—like the first, failed transaction— 
Gilbert would have sold the property to Wright. (R. 2201:72.) Therefore, the only issue 
was the seller financing, which suggests that the only issue was Butterfield"s ability to 
repay Gilbert. Yet Gilbert testified that he performed no due diligence on the seller-
financed deal because he was "getting half a million dollars down," which was "[p]retty 
good insurance." (R. 2001:108, 107.) Gilbert explained that due diligence on Butterfield 
was unnecessary because Gilbert received $500,000 by the time of closing and retained 
the right to foreclose on the property, which he eventually did. As Gilbert explained, "if 
Butterfield's a deadbeat and defaults, I get to keep the money he's paid me down, and I 
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repossess the property." (R. 2001:107-10.) Thus, the financial condition of the buyer 
and obligor were of no concern to Gilbert and would not have been of concern to any 
reasonable seller who received a $500,000 down payment. Other than Butterfield's 
ability to repay the seller financing, it is difficult to discern any reason for Gilbert, or any 
seller in his position, to be concerned about Wright's "involvement," even if Wright were 
the buyer or obligor, let alone if Wright were involved in some more attenuated sense. 
For all of these reasons, under Utah law the only arguably material information 
concerning Wright's "involvement" would have been information that Wright was the 
real buyer or obligor, but it is undisputed that Wright was neither the real buyer nor the 
real obligor. Gilbert therefore could not prove that information concerning Wright's 
involvement in the seller-financed transaction was material, which is fatal to his 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim. The trial court properly dismissed it. 
2. Wright Was Not Involved in the Seller-Financed Transaction or 
the Wardley Defendants Knew Nothing About His Involvement 
Even if Gilbert's broad idiosyncratic use of the term "involved" that included 
Wright's stepping foot on the property or pulling weeds on the property was legally 
relevant,8 at best there is evidence Gilbert communicated that condition to only one 
Wardley defendant, LoCicero.9 Gilbert concedes in the opening brief, however, that the 
only information LoCicero possessed concerning Wright was told to LoCicero by Gilbert 
himself. (AOB at 28.) LoCicero did not need to tell Gilbert what he already knew. The 
Gilbert did not understand the term so broadly except in hindsight. When Gilbert 
learned Wright had been "involved"—Wright called Gilbert on behalf of Butterfield— 
Gilbert did not file any claims against Wardley or call a Wardley agent to complain. 
(R. 2001:163-65.) Only after the bankruptcy did Gilbert complain. (R. 2201:166.) 
It appears that Wright may have understood that Gilbert subjectively used "involved" 
in the broadest possible sense as well, but Wright is not a defendant. (R. 2202:230-33.) 
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most Gilbert can say is that the jury may have concluded LoCicero was lying, but Gilbert 
provides no evidence by which the jury could have reached that conclusion. (AOB at 
28.) Therefore, while LoCicero arguably understood that Gilbert did not want Wright to 
be involved in "any way, shape, or form," LoCicero had no information that Wright was 
involved in any way, shape, or form.10 (R. 2202:142-43, 148, 150, 176-77, 182, 186.) 
As for Grymes, Riddle, and Melling, Gilbert never clarified for them what he 
meant by the term "involved," leaving them to understand it, quite reasonably, to mean 
that Wright could not be "the person on the other end of the deal." (R. 2202:19, 40, 123, 
176, 154-56.) Moreover, the only Wardley defendants who dealt with Wright—Riddle 
and Melling—had no dealings with Wright during the seller-financed transaction. 
(R. 2202:38, 70.) The evidence that anyone was aware of Wright's "involvement" stems 
from the first transaction, which is not at issue here. Butterfield hired counsel to 
represent him in negotiating the seller-financed transaction, and thereafter the Wardley 
defendants learned nothing concerning Wright's "involvement" in that deal. 
The evidence Gilbert sets forth in the opening brief proves this point. Although 
Grymes testified that he had no recollection of Gilbert's conversation, if Gilbert is to be 
believed, then Grymes was aware that (i) Wright knew Butterfield, (ii) Wright provided 
documents to Butterfield, and (iii) Mobile Mansions had demanded the earnest money 
from the previous transaction that is not at issue in this case. (AOB at 30.) As a limited 
agent, Grymes's duty was to disclose information that "would be a material 
misrepresentation regarding the property or regarding the abilities of the parties to fulfill 
10
 Gilbert argues LoCicero had a duty to investigate the rumor Wright was involved; 
however, even if correct, LoCicero's co-agent, Fuller, did investigate. (AOB at 10, 29.) 
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their obligations." Utah Admin. Code R162-6.2.15.3.1(c). Wright's being acquainted 
with Butterfield or his information courier does not impact Butterfield's ability to fulfill 
obligations, especially in a seller-financed transaction with a $500,000 down payment. 
Gilbert cites evidence that Melling was aware that (i) Wright couriered 
information to Butterfield, (ii) Butterfield did business with Wright, and (iii) Gilbert had 
a concern over Wright's company, Capital Housing, being "involved." (AOB at 32.) 
Gilbert then cites evidence that Riddle was aware that in the previous transaction 
(i) Wright had couriered information to Butterfield, (ii) Wright communicated how to 
negotiate, and (iii) Wright was going to be "in charge" of any future development project. 
(AOB at 34-35.) Melling and Riddle, as Butterfield's agents, had a duty to be "honest, 
ethical, and competent." Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, ^ j 22. As Gilbert recognized in the 
opening brief, Utah case law applies this duty only to disclosing material defects in the 
property, not information about the agent's client with regard to financing. (AOB at 23.) 
Thus, Melling and Riddle had no unfulfilled duties, even if they had known Wright was 
somehow "involved" in the seller-financed transaction, which they did not. 
In short, there is no evidence that any Wardley defendant had any information 
concerning Wright's "involvement" in the seller-financed transaction. Moreover, as the 
trial court noted, no reasonable juror could have found there was clear and convincing 
evidence that any Wardley defendant acted with intent to defraud, an essential element of 
the fraudulent nondisclosure claim. (R. 2203:228-29.) Here, there was nothing clear or 
convincing about what Gilbert told the Wardley defendants, what the Wardley defendants 
knew about Wright's involvement in the seller-financed transaction, or, most important, 
whether the Wardley defendants intended to defraud anyone. This court should affirm. 
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C. Dismissal Was Appropriate Because Gilbert Suffered No Damages 
The trial court could have dismissed the fraudulent nondisclosure claim on the 
alternative ground that Gilbert suffered no damages. Damages cannot place a plaintiff in 
a better position than had the defendants acted just as the plaintiff contends. Mahmood v. 
Ross, 1999 UT 104, ^  31, 990 P.2d 933; Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 
2004 UT 70, If 37, 98 P.3d 15. Gilbert does not seek to affirm the seller-finance 
agreement, and instead states that he would not have entered into the seller-financed 
transaction had he known about Wright's "involvement." (AOB at 9, 24.) Thus, 
assuming Gilbert could otherwise prove fraudulent nondisclosure, Gilbert could recover 
only those damages that would put Gilbert in the position he would have been in had the 
seller-financed transaction with Butterfield never taken place. 
For this reason, Gilbert could not have recovered damages for the following 
claimed losses: (i) interest or late payments or remaining payments from Butterfield 
under the purchase contract; (ii) past property taxes paid after Gilbert repossessed the 
property; and (iii) maintenance of the property. At most, Gilbert would not have incurred 
the "nearly $600,000 in legal fees" in defending against a California bankruptcy trustee's 
complaint against Gilbert. (AOB at 12.) But if Gilbert had not sold the property to 
Butterfield, he also could not have kept the $638,608.05 that Butterfield paid him. 
Gilbert therefore benefited from any nondisclosure. 
D. Partial Directed Verdict Was Appropriate Because Gilbert's 
Consequential Damages Were Not Reasonably Foreseeable and 
Wardley Was Not the Proximate Cause of Gilbert's Claimed Losses 
Apart from profiting from any nondisclosure, Gilbert could not have recovered 
consequential damages of the "nearly $600,000" he spent on attorney fees in bankruptcy 
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proceedings because those fees were not the reasonably foreseeable result of any 
nondisclosure of Wright's "involvement." To recover consequential damages, a plaintiff 
must present evidence that the damages were reasonably foreseeable. w'[T]he only 
damages recoverable are those that could be reasonably foreseen and anticipated by the 
parties at the time the contract was entered into. Mere knowledge of possible harm is not 
enough." Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979). 
Here, after the sale of the property on January 13, 2000, Butterfield made six 
payments through February 2, 2001. (R. 1196.) On February 28, 2001, Mobile Mansions 
(a company owned by Butterfield) filed bankruptcy. (R. 1198; 2203:12.) On June 8, 
2001, Butterfield filed bankruptcy. (R. 1198.) On February 27, 2002, counsel for the 
trustee in the Mobile Mansions' bankruptcy filed a complaint against Gilbert clouding 
title to the property and seeking the return of the money Butterfield had paid Gilbert. 
(R. 1201.) Gilbert characterized these claims as "frivolous" and contends that he spent 
"nearly $600,000" defending against them. (AOB at 12.) Frivolous claims filed by a 
California bankruptcy trustee more than two years later are not the reasonably foreseeable 
result of Wright being "involved" in the seller-financed transaction, especially where the 
reason for Butterfield's bankruptcy was his divorce, gambling problems, and lines of 
credit in his flooring business being called due. (R. 2202:250-71.) Thus, Gilbert could 
not have recovered the "nearly $600,000" in attorney fees. 
For similar reasons, a reasonable juror could not have found proximate cause. 
Under Utah law, Gilbert had to prove not only "but for" causation, but also proximate 
causation. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(fiduciary duty claim requires proof of actual and proximate cause); Crookston v. Fire 
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Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) (fraud requires proof of proximate cause). 
"Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence (unbroken 
by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result would 
not have occurred." Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, H 22, 990 P.2d 933. 
For reasons just discussed, Gilbert's incurring fees in defending against the 
trustee's frivolous claims in the California bankruptcy was not the "natural" consequence 
of Wright's involvement with Butterfield. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 
(Utah 1986) ("A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter 
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture . . . it becomes the duty of the court to 
direct a verdict for the defendant."). For this additional reason, Gilbert's fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim would have failed as a matter of law. This court should affirm the 
dismissal of Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion n the Amount of Attorney Fees 
It Awarded the Wardley Defendants 
This court should also affirm the trial court's finding that the amount of attorney 
fees it awarded the Wardley defendants was reasonable. Under Utah law, trial courts 
have considerable discretion in determining whether attorney fees are reasonable, and 
appellate courts will reverse a reasonableness finding only where there has been "a clear 
abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Utah 1988). 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in awarding the Wardley 
defendants $397,911 in attorney fees under the contractual attorney fee provision.11 
11
 The attorney fee provision provides: "[I]n case of the employment of an attorney in 
any matter arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
receive from the other party all costs and attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved 
through court action or otherwise." (R. 2095.) 
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The Wardley defendants agreed to waive conflicts and share counsel, which saved 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorney fees. Even so, the Wardley defendants did 
not submit all attorney fees they incurred (R. 1996), and the trial court did not award the 
Wardley defendants all attorney fees they submitted. (R. 2162.) 
Gilbert nonetheless challenges the amount of the award. Tellingly, Gilbert did not 
submit his attorneys' bills to compare with the Wardley defendants' bills. By May of 
2006—two years before trial—Gilbert had paid Ray, Quinney & Nebeker $275,150, a 
figure that does not include the claimed fees of Gilbert's in-house counsel. (R. 1941.) In 
contrast, the attorney fees award was only $122,761 more than Gilbert's figure after 
(i) two more years of litigation, (ii) a six-day trial, and (iii) briefing post-trial motions. 
(R. 2164.) Unsurprisingly, the trial court found it "entirely relevant to observe that, 
nearly two years before trial, [Gilbert] had already incurred fees equal to 69% of [the 
Wardley defendants'] fees for the entire litigation through the jury trial." (R. 2158.) 
Moreover, the context of this case is sufficient to demonstrate that the trial court's 
attorney fees award of $397,911 was reasonable. Gilbert was a well-financed and 
relentless plaintiff, with experienced in-house counsel and the Salt Lake City office of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker prosecuting 11 separate claims and seeking more than $6 
million in damages. Had Gilbert succeeded, each of the Wardley defendants would have 
faced financial ruin. Fortunately, the Wardley defendants had counsel who carefully, 
thoroughly, and efficiently prepared a defense and prevailed at trial. For reasons set forth 
in more detail below, this court should affirm the trial court's reasonableness finding. 
12
 Gilbert did not challenge in the trial court that all 5 Wardley defendants were entitled 
to recover fees under the provision. (R. 2153.) 
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A. This Court Should Refuse to Consider Gilbert's Challenge Because He 
Failed to Marshal Evidence in Support of the Reasonableness Finding 
Gilbert failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's findings. Under 
Utah law, a party challenging a trial court finding must marshal evidence in support of 
that finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As this court has explained, the marshaling 
requirement applies when a party is challenging a trial court's finding that attorney fees 
are reasonable. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, Tj 60, 71 P.3d 188. 
And when a party fails to marshal evidence in challenging the reasonableness of 
an attorney fees award, this court may decline to address the argument. Kealamakia, Inc. 
v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, ^  8, 213 P.3d 13. Because Gilbert failed to marshal 
any evidence in support of the trial court's reasonableness finding, this court should 
refuse to consider his various challenges to the trial court's reasonableness finding. 
B. The Trial Court Found, Based Upon Substantial Evidence, That the 
Fees award Was Reasonable Under the Dixie State Factors 
Had Gilbert marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, it 
would have revealed ample evidence to support those findings. In determining the 
amount of an attorney fees award, trial courts consider the following non-exhaustive list 
of factors: wCthe difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the result 
attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved." Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 1988). Here, the Gilbert defendants provided 
sufficient evidence to support the attorney fees award under each of these factors. 
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There was evidence this litigation was difficult. Russell Mitchell with Jones 
Waldo and Matthew Lalli with Snell & Wilmer both submitted affidavits in support of 
the attorney fees request, and both testified that the "legal issues in the case were novel 
and very difficult" and that the "factual issues were relatively complex and required a 
great deal of work to conduct and assimilate necessary discovery [and in] consultation 
with various experts." (R. 1993, 1951.) The trial court found this case to be "somewhat 
unusual in its factual and legal complexity." (R. 2161.) 
There was evidence the Wardley defendants' attorneys were efficient. The 
Wardley defendants were jointly represented, and, unlike Gilbert's counsel, the Wardley 
defendants had only one attorney attend depositions in this case. (R. 2097.) Moreover, 
Mr. Lalli testified that because there was some turnover in representation—including 
some turnover within the firm—Snell & Wilmer had "discounted its rates and wrote off 
some time that was necessary to ramp up for trial." (R. 1996.) In addition, Mr. Lalli 
testified that attorneys with specialized knowledge were used at times "to maximize 
efficiency." (R. 1996.) The trial court found counsel for the Wardley defendants to be 
efficient, especially considering that Gilbert's counsel had "incurred fees equal to 69% of 
[the Wardley defendants'] fees for the entire litigation through the jury trial." (R. 2158.) 
There was evidence that the number of hours spent was reasonable. The Wardley 
defendants submitted scores of pages of bills that detail what each attorney did during the 
time billed, and both Mr. Lalli and Mr. Mitchell testified that the hours submitted were 
reasonable. (R. 1951, 1993.) As Mr. Lalli also explained, because Mr. Gilbert's counsel 
was 6swell prepared and professional," the Wardley defendants' counsel had to pay extra 
attention to detail in this case. (R. 1994.) The trial court found that the work performed 
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by counsel for the Wardley defendants 4Cwas reasonably necessary to present a completely 
successful defense against [Gilbert's] several claims." (R. 2161.) 
There was evidence that the fee was customary. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Lalli both 
testified that the hours devoted by attorneys in their firms and the hourly rates they 
charged were "reasonable in the community for comparable legal services." (R. 1951, 
1993.) The trial court found that Washington County is neither "isolated from the rest of 
Utah" nor "more economically distressed than the rest of Utah," and that its residents 
typically "purchase goods and services" outside their county, and, therefore, it made no 
sense to treat the county as an isolated "locality" for purposes of attorney services in a 
complex case such as this. (R. 2160.) The court also found that Salt Lake City rates 
were reasonable given the complexity of this case. (R. 2160-61.) 
There was evidence that the amount at issue and ultimate result supported the trial 
court's award. Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Lalli both testified that the fees were reasonable 
given the (i) amount of damages sought, more than $6 million; and (ii) the result in the 
case, a complete victory for the Wardley defendants. (R. 1952, 1994.) The trial court 
also found that counsel for the Wardley defendants presented "a completely successful 
defense against [Gilbert's] several claims," with which Gilbert "sought judgment of more 
than $6,000,000 against [the Wardley defendants]." (R. 2152, 2161.) 
Finally, there was evidence that the experience and expertise of the attorneys 
justified the trial court's award. Mr. Lalli detailed the level of experience of each person 
who worked on the case, and testified about his own experience of "trying large 
commercial cases." (R. 1991-96.) The trial court found the work done by counsel for the 
Wardley defendants to be "exemplary" and specifically noted that the Wardley 
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defendants' "lead attorney, Mr. Lalli, was especially well prepared, professional, skillful, 
expert, and effective in this case." (R. 2161.) 
Based upon that evidence—as well as more evidence detailed in the extensive 
billing records that the trial court reviewed—the trial court found that nearly all of the 
attorney fees requested by the Wardley defendants were reasonable and awarded 
$397,911. (R. 2162.) It is difficult to understand what is deficient in this evidence, 
which Gilbert failed to marshal, or the court's findings. At the very least, the trial court's 
attorney fees award was not a "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Utah 1988). This court should affirm the attorney fees award. 
C. If This Court Addresses the Individual Challenges to the Attorney Fees 
Award, This Court Should Reject Each 
If the court reaches each of Gilbert's various sub-arguments, it should reject them. 
As an initial matter, this court should reject the sub-arguments because with them Gilbert 
advances an interpretation of the attorney fee provision he previously rejected. 
The attorney fees provision provides: "[I]n case of the employment of an attorney 
in any matter arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled 
to receive from the other party all costs and attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved 
through court action or otherwise." (R. 2095 (emphasis added).) In the trial court, 
Gilbert interpreted this language as sanctioning his recovery of all fees charged by his 
Salt Lake City law firm, without regard to whether the actions taken by that law firm 
were individually successful or particularly efficient. As Gilbert testified, "[wje're going 
to claim all attorney fees that have been expended on this lawsuit." (R. 2110.) Gilbert 
explained that "the documents and contracts I signed said that I'm entitled to all actual 
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costs and all actual attorney fees. So if they've been expended on the case, then my 
understanding is I'm entitled to them." (R. 2110.) Gilbert then acted in accordance with 
this interpretation in his second supplemental Rule 26(a) disclosures, in which he sought 
all attorney fees billed by Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and his in-house counsel. (R. 1941.) 
Under Utah law, when a party claims entitlement to attorney fees under a 
contractual provision, the other party is entitled to fees under that provision regardless of 
whether the first party was correct that the provision sanctioned the fees award. Hooban 
v. Unicity Inf I Inc., 2009 UT App 287, % 9, 220 P.3d 485 (citing Bilanzich v. Lonettu 
2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041); see also Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 
1222, 1224 (Utah 1988) (estoppel generally applies to claims for attorney fees). To 
prevent a party from taking such inconsistent positions, some courts apply judicial 
estoppel13 and other courts apply equitable estoppel.14 To the same end, this court could 
consider the actions of Gilbert in interpreting the attorney fees provision as relevant and 
construe the provision as sanctioning an award of all costs and attorney fees incurred by 
the Wardley defendants. Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 228, 225 P.2d 739 
(1950) (subsequent actions of the parties to a contract provision are relevant to its 
interpretation). Regardless of legal packaging, Gilbert should not be permitted to 
interpret the provision in a manner he previously rejected simply because he did not 
prevail at trial. Even ignoring this global problem, however, each argument fails. 
13
 International Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(non-prevailing party judicially estopped from changing positions re fee provision). 
14
 Hammann v. Falls/Pinnacle, LLC, Nos. A07-0515, A07-1252, 2008 Minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 351 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2008) (non-prevailing party equitably 
estopped from changing positions re the fees provision). 
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1. Trial Courts Have Discretion to Award Attorney Fees Incurred 
in Preparing Arguments for Motion Papers Where the Motion Is 
Denied but the Arguments Are Ultimately Successful 
Gilbert's first sub-argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
the Wardley defendants $54,407.50 for fees incurred in preparing a motion for summary 
judgment that was denied. (AOB at 39-41.) While Gilbert cites cases that indicate fees 
incurred in preparing unsuccessful motions are not part of a prevailing party's successful 
efforts, none of these cases adopt the per se rule Gilbert invites this court to adopt. 
The two cases Gilbert cites are Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App 503, 128 
P.3d 63, and ProMax Development Corporation v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254. 
(AOB at 39-41.) ProMax states, without discussion, that the court was declining to 
award Raile "'fees in pursuing their unsuccessful motion to dismiss this appeal." ProMax, 
2000 UT 4, |32. ProMax says nothing about whether the arguments in the motion to 
dismiss were related to the later successful effort on appeal. 
Beus provides a discussion and states that only fees "attributable to the successful 
vindication of contractual rights" should be recovered, but Beus reverses the award of 
fees incurred in preparing an unsuccessful summary judgment motion because "nothing 
since then has changed the propriety of that ruling.'" Beus, 2005 UT App 503, ^ f 17. In 
contrast, here something did happen after the denial of Wardley's motion for summary 
judgment that "changed the propriety of that ruling." Wardley moved for summary 
judgment on the following grounds: (i) Gilbert could not prove proximate cause, and is 
not entitled to consequential damages, because Gilbert's claimed losses were not 
reasonably foreseeable; and (ii) Gilbert's claims of "collusive tort" and "aiding and 
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abetting fraud" are not recognized under Utah law. (R. 1125-28.) In denying the motion, 
the trial court stated that Wardley's arguments were ''strong." (R. 1625-27.) 
The arguments were apparently strong enough that, just before trial, the trial court 
questioned whether collusive tort or aiding and abetting fraud are recognized under Utah 
law. (R. 1125-28; 2207:48-49, 87.) And the trial court's articulation of the arguments in 
Wardley's motion papers was apparently persuasive enough that Gilbert voluntarily 
dismissed his claims for collusive tort and aiding and abetting fraud. (R. 2207:48-49, 
87.) Moreover, this court can judge for itself whether Wardley's proximate-cause 
arguments should have prevailed. These subsequent developments "changed the 
propriety" of the ruling.15 
Regardless, this court should not adopt a rule that trial courts can never find time 
spent preparing unsuccessful motions contributes to a successful vindication of rights. 
As the trial court noted, unsuccessful motions for summary judgment can have a number 
of benefits, including (i) producing important evidence; (ii) testing a party's 
understanding of legal issues and command of the facts; and (iii) revealing new facts 
valuable for negotiation and trial. (R. 2156.) Here, the trial court did not mindlessly 
award the Wardley defendants their fees. Instead, the court carefully considered the 
evidence and found: "Having heard the summary judgment motion as well as having 
conducted the jury trial of this case, and having studied summary judgment practice for 
15
 Alternatively, Gilbert argues that the amount of attorney fees Jones Waldo incurred on 
the motion was unreasonable. (AOB at 40-41.) This argument does not appear in 
Gilbert's opposition to the request for attorney fees, and therefore, is not preserved for 
appeal. (R. 2074-75.) In fact, in the trial court Gilbert stated that it was "impossible to 
tell" whether work performed by Jones Waldo was duplicative. (R. 2079.) 
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nearly three decades, this Court finds both Defendants' motion and the time spent by 
their counsel on the motion to be reasonable in a case of this magnitude." (R. 2156.) 
This finding was not "a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
988-89. If this court addresses Gilbert's challenge to the trial court's award of attorney 
fees related to the motion for summary judgment, the court should reject the challenge. 
2. St George Trial Courts Have Discretion to Award Fees at Salt 
Lake City Rates in Sufficiently Complex Cases 
Gilbert next argues that the Wardley defendants could not recover any attorney 
fees at Salt Lake City rates. (AOB at 41-45.) To make this argument, Gilbert assumes 
that '"locality" means St. George for any case in which the trial is held in St. George. 
Gilbert concedes, as he must, however, that Utah appellate courts have not adopted a rule 
that, as a matter of law, only St. George rates may be awarded for a case in St. George. 
(AOB at 42.) This court should not adopt that per se rule here, especially since, as the 
trial court found, the rates charged by counsel for the Wardley defendants Cwwere 
specifically discounted for this action." (R. 2159.) 
Utah courts have not addressed how ^locality" is to be determined in awarding 
attorney fees. This court should adopt the view that "locality" refers to the location of the 
court, except when, as here, the complexity of the case warrants counsel from outside that 
specific location. Gilbert originally believed Salt Lake County should be the location of 
this lawsuit, as he filed his complaint in Salt Lake County. And all parties concluded that 
the complexity of the case warranted counsel from Salt Lake City because Gilbert and 
each Wardley defendant (as well as many other original defendants) retained Salt Lake 
City law firms. On appeal, all parties again are using Salt Lake City law firms, as Gilbert 
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has now retained the Salt Lake City office of Stoel Rives. At the very least, a contracting 
party should be permitted to hire counsel equivalent to counsel hired by the other party 
without forfeiting the right to recover a portion of its attorney fees. 
The trial court interpreted "locality" to be "the general geographic area in which a 
party litigating . . . might reasonably look for litigation counsel." (R. 2160.) Of course, 
the more complex the case, the more reasonable it will be to seek counsel from outside 
the city in which the court is located. As the trial court noted, this case was "unusual in 
its factual and legal complexity," and the legal work performed by all attorneys was 
"exemplary." (R. 2161.) After "[h]aving reviewed all the information provided by the 
parties," the trial court found "no reason to believe that the rates charged by Defendants' 
attorneys were unreasonable." (R. 2161.) 
The approach of the trial court is consistent with that of courts in other 
jurisdictions. As the First Circuit explained, "Where it is unreasonable to select a higher 
priced outside attorney—as, for example, in an ordinary case requiring no specialized 
abilities not amply reflected among local lawyers—the local rate is the appropriate 
yardstick." Maceira v. Pagan, 698 F.2d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 1983). However, "if the client 
needs to go to a different city to find that specialist, he will expect to pay the rate 
prevailing in that city. In such a case, there is no basis for concluding that the specialist's 
ordinary rate is unreasonably high." Id. In Pagan, the court approved of awarding 
Detroit rates for a case tried in Puerto Rico. Id. 
For similar reasons, in a case in which both parties retained counsel from Portland, 
the Oregon Court of Appeals approved an award at Portland rates, which were up to $129 
more per hour than rates in southern Oregon where the trial was held. HannaLtd. P'ship 
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v. Windmill Inns of Am., Inc., 194 P.3d 874, 882 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). A Washington 
court similarly declined to limit "locality" to anything other than the entire Puget Sound 
area. Hudson Co. v. Ryffel No. 37403-0-II, 2009 Wash. App. LEXIS 2155, Tff| 24-25 
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2009). And courts in New Jersey and Ohio have gone so far as 
to define "locality" to mean the location of counsel's office, even holding that it was an 
abuse of discretion to limit locality to where the trial was held. Village of W. Unity ex 
rel.Beltzv. Merillat 861 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); In re Trust of Brown, 517 
A.2d 893, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). 
The reasoning of the trial court here, and courts in other jurisdictions, in rejecting 
the per se rule advanced by Gilbert is persuasive. This court should not prohibit St. 
George trial judges from finding it reasonable for St. George clients to hire Salt Lake City 
counsel with a particular expertise in complex cases. If Salt Lake City rates were per se 
unreasonable, then, in sufficiently complex cases, St. George clients must forfeit either 
their ability to recover attorney fees or their right to hire counsel with the expertise their 
case requires. At the very least, clients should be able to recover fees at rates in the 
"locality" from which the other party's attorneys practice, here Salt Lake City. If the 
court addresses Gilbert's challenge to the rates charged by the Wardley defendants' 
counsel, the court should reject that challenge. 
3. Fees Incurred When New Counsel Discusses Issues with Prior 
Counsel Are Not Per Se Unreasonable 
This court also should reject Gilbert's challenge to unspecified time entries 
concerning the transition of counsel. In the trial court, Gilbert acknowledged that the 
evidence provided by the Wardley defendants showed wCthat they are not making a claim 
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for time spent by their former counsel con transition related items.'" (R. 2155.) Thus, 
only Snell & Wilmer's fees are at issue. And the issue is not whether duplicative work 
occurred during transition of counsel, but whether the time submitted was duplicative. 
In the trial court, Gilbert stated that he could not refute the affidavits provided by 
the Wardley defendants stating that the fees were reasonably incurred because the time 
entries reveal no duplicative time entries. (R. 2079.) In light of Gilbert's conceded 
inability to call into question the Wardley defendants' fees, he invited the trial court to 
"use its best judgment and reduce the fees accordingly." (R. 2079.) The trial court 
reviewed the billing records, and used its best judgment to find the "records and 
explanations to be sufficient to overcome speculation" that the Wardley defendants must 
be including some "duplication of work." (R. 2155.) 
On appeal, Gilbert merely repeats his inability to show that any work was 
duplicative and asks this court to impose upon the Wardley defendants the burden of 
proving a negative: "The Wardley Defendants presented no evidence that the time spent 
by their current and prior firms was for anything other than transition between two 
firms." (AOB at 46.) The Wardley defendants provided evidence that they wrote off 
time and discounted rates due to "turnover in representation," including turnover within 
the law firm. (R. 1996.) The Wardley defendants also provided evidence that all fees 
submitted were reasonably incurred, i.e., not duplicative, evidence the trial court 
apparently found persuasive in light of the pages of time entries it reviewed. (R. 1993.) 
In response, Gilbert asserts that pages 2020 to 2022 of the record reveal that 
Wardley's "attorneys spent approximately $2,632.50 on issue related to the transition." 
(AOB at 46.) Without specifying which time entries are objectionable, it is unclear 
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which of the 56 time entries totaling more than $12,000 require further explanation in 
Gilbert's view. (R. 2020-22.) And without more specificity, it is difficult to demonstrate 
that the entries were not duplicative of anything Jones Waldo billed. 
Gilbert also complains about time entries related to the bankruptcy proceedings in 
California but fails to mention that the depositions in those bankruptcy proceedings were 
used in this case, and therefore, despite Gilbert's assertion to the contrary, "time spent on 
the bankruptcy litigation is compensable." (AOB at 46.) This court should reject 
Gilbert's challenge to the fees he speculates were duplicative. 
4. Conducting a Single Mock Trial in Preparing for Trial in a 
Multi-Million Dollar Lawsuit Is Not Per Se Unreasonable 
This court also should reject Gilbert's challenge to fees incurred in conducting a 
single mock trial. The trial court found the mock trial to be "a reasonable investment of 
time" in a complex case with more than $6 million at issue and something that "clearly 
aided in [defendants'] preparation for the long, difficult jury trial." (R. 2157.) The court 
also found, "[t]he unusual high intensity of the conflict between the parties and the large 
amount in controversy justified—even necessitated—more than usual trial preparation." 
(R. 2157.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Gilbert asserts the Wardley defendants "requested, and the trial court awarded, 
$45,669.00 in fees for a 'mock trial.'" (AOB at 47.) The opening brief does not mention 
that the trial court specifically rejected Gilbert's $45,669 figure as ''clearly incorrect, 
since many time entries which mention 'mock trial' also mention work unrelated to the 
mock trial." (R. 2157.) Moreover, some entries for the mock trial describe work used for 
trial. Gilbert does not attempt to correct that problem identified by the trial court. 
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Gilbert argues that the trial court had insufficient evidence to conclude the mock 
trial was a reasonable expense. Since Gilbert failed to marshal evidence, Wardley 
interprets Gilbert's argument as advocating a rule of law—fees incurred for mock trials 
are per se unrecoverable. This court should reject the rule. Courts routinely award fees 
related to mock trials that "confer a benefit to the prevailing party by helping to produce a 
favorable result." City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So. 2d 962, 979 (La. Ct. 
App. 2001).16 Mock trials can "prepare even the most experienced litigators for trials and 
oral arguments.... Such time is appropriately billed to clients." Moon v. Gab Kwon, 
No. 99 Civ. 11810 (GEL), 2002 WL 31512816, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2002). "[T]ime 
spent rehearsing oral advocacy, i.e., 'moot court/ may be compensated as long as the 
time requested is not 'excessive.'" Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., No. l:96-cv-
066BSJ, 2007 WL 3550342, at *22 (D. Utah Nov. 15, 2007). 
Here, the time spent on the mock trial was not excessive, especially considering 
the dire consequences for the Wardley defendants and that the time preparing for the 
mock trial was simultaneously used to prepare for trial. There is no reason for this court 
to adopt a per se rule that trial courts cannot consider the complexity of the case it just 
presided over and find that fees associated with a single mock trial were reasonable. This 
court should reject Gilbert's challenge concerning the mock trial fees. 
5. The Record Shows That Time Spent Defending Contract Claims 
Also Defended Tort Claims 
This court also should reject Gilbert's challenge concerning the allocation of fees 
between tort and contract claims. Gilbert claims in the opening brief that if he succeeds 
16
 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Charles v. Daley. 846 F.2d 1057, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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in resurrecting his fraudulent nondisclosure claim, he could become the "prevailing 
party" for purposes of attorney fees. (AOB at 35-37.) To be correct, the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim must be encompassed by the attorney fee provision, which, by its 
own terms, applies "in any matter arising out of this Listing Agreement." (R. 2095.) If 
fraudulent nondisclosure arises out of the listing agreement, then there is no need to 
allocate between tort and contract claims and, more important, the argument that the jury, 
in fact, rejected the fraudulent nondisclosure claim with its answers on the special verdict 
form becomes more straightforward and compelling. 
Assuming fees incurred in defending tort claims are unrecoverable, Gilbert's 
argument still fails. Under Utah law, "where the proof of a compensable claim and 
otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the same facts, 
a successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related 
facts." Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, ^ 20, 978 P.2d 470. 
Where such issues are intertwined, a court may award the full amount of attorney fees to 
the prevailing party, even where the party does not separate time that does not pertain to 
the contract claims. Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Lalli testified that ww[a]lthough there were contractual and 
non-contractual claims at issue, the evidence rebutting all such claims was necessary to 
defend against the contractual claims." (R. 1952; 1994.) And based upon that testimony, 
and having presided over the case and observed the overlap, the trial court found that 
"[a]ll of [Gilbert's] claims were based on the Listing Agreement and on theories of 
17
 While determining the prevailing party in multi-claim case is difficult only where each 
party prevails on claims encompassed by the attorney fee provision. R.T. Nielson Co. v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 11, ffif 23-26, 40 P.3d 1119. 
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liability which depended on the Listing Agreement." (R. 2155.) Moreover, the trial court 
found that Gilbert's "causes of action were different theories of recovery based on the 
same set of facts. Under these circumstances, Defendants are not required to account 
separately for the time spent by each of the ten persons on each of [Gilbert's] several 
causes of action over the course of five years of litigation." (R. 2155.) This court should 
also reject Gilbert's challenge related to the overlap of claims. 
Conclusion 
This court should not resurrect Gilbert's fraudulent nondisclosure claim because 
(i) with the jury's answer on the special verdict form, it rejected the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim; (ii) the court correctly dismissed that claim because no material 
information was undisclosed; and (iii) the court could have dismissed that claim because 
Gilbert suffered no damages. This court should also affirm the trial court's attorney fees 
award because it is supported by record evidence, which Gilbert failed to marshal. 
This court should (i) affirm the trial court's dismissal of the fraudulent 
nondisclosure claim; (ii) affirm the trial court's finding that the amount of Wardley's 
attorney fees was reasonable; (iii) award Wardley its attorney fees on appeal as the 
prevailing party; and (iv) remand to permit the trial court to supplement the judgment 
against Gilbert with Wardley's reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 2010. 
SNELL & WILMERL.L.P. 
Troy L. Bother 
Attorney for Appellees 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR / 





WARDLEY CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE AWARD OF 
; ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 030501128 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter now comes before the Court upon the "Bill of Costs" and the "Request for 
Attorneys' Fees'5 filed by defendants Wardley Corporation, Terry LoCicero, Don Grymes, Lloyd 
Melling, and Chad Riddle (collectively the "Defendants"), who were the remaining defendants when 
this case reached jury trial last year. Defendants' claims for fees and costs are vigorously disputed 
by Plaintiff. The Court has heard oral arguments and has reviewed the papers and authorities filed 
in support of and in opposition to Defendants' claims. 
This case began with a complaint filed in this Court on June 5,2003, after a change of venue 
from another court. Plaintiff named ten different defendants, including all the Defendants who went 
to trial. Plaintiff sought judgment of more than $6,000,000 against these Defendants. Plaintiffs 
claims were all based upon or dependent upon a written Listing Agreement involving Plaintiff and 
Defendants, which provided, with one inapplicable exception: "|T)n case of the employment of an 
attorney in any matter arising out of this Listing Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
receive from the other party all costs and attorney fees, whether the matter is resolved through court 
action or otherwise." 
Some of Plaintiffs claims were resolved in Defendants' favor prior to trial. At the 
conclusion of the seven-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of Defendants on all remaining claims. 
Clearly, Defendants are the prevailing party and are "entitled to receive from [Plaintiff] all 
costs and attorney fees" according to the bargain made in the Listing Agreement.1 It is the Court's 
responsibility to enforce the fees-and-costs provision of the Listing Agreement, just as it would 
enforce any other provision of the Listing Agreement. 
HOURS REASONABLY EXPENDED BY DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS 
Defendants' Request for Attorneys' Fees is supported by an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs signed by their lead attorney, Matthew L. Lalli. Attached to the Affidavit is a 61 -page printout 
listing work and cost descriptions and dollar amounts claimed. The Affidavit lists the names of all 
persons in Mr. Lalli's law firm who worked on Defendants' case, the total hours for each person, and 
a total dollar amount of $338,390. Defendants' Request is also supported by the Affidavit of Russell 
S. Mitchell, with similar records, describing work done by Defendants' original attorneys and 
claiming a total dollar amount of $61,146. Except for the issue of transition between firms, Plaintiff 
has not separately challenged Mr. Mitchell's portion of Defendants' Request, so it will not be 
separately discussed herein. Plaintiff challenges the hours reported and claimed by Defendants' 
attorneys in five respects: 
!The parties to the Listing Agreement were Plaintiff and "Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens," a business owned and operated by defendant Wardley Corporation. The four 
individual defendants were officers and/or employees of Wardley Corporation, and Plaintiff has 
not challenged or separately treated these defendants' claims for fees and costs pursuant to the 
provision of the Listing Agreement. 
2 
1. Project Assistants and IT Department The Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees lists two 
persons as "Proj. Assist." and one person as "IT Dept" Plaintiff challenges charges for the work of 
these persons, asserting that these are a part of the "standard overhead in any law firm" and not what 
could be deemed to be "attorneys' fees." In argument, Mr. Lalli explained that a "project assistant" 
is a paralegal. While there are some circumstances in which this Court does not award paralegal 
fees, the use of paralegals has been recognized for many years as a desirable practice in litigation and 
other legal work, to promote efficiency and thrift and to limit both the hours spent and the hourly 
rates charged by attorneys. Paralegals generally do work that attorneys could do and might have 
done in past decades, but at a lower cost. The paralegals' fees claimed by Defendants' are not part 
of their counsel's overhead, and may be awarded as part of attorneys' fees. Mr. Lalli also explained 
in argument the IT2 person assisted with preparation of the "electronic presentation" used in the trial. 
While that presentation was well-done and very effective, it appears to me to be too far removed 
from the work that attorneys have traditionally done to be included as "attorneys' fees." 
Consequently, the charge of $1625 for thirteen hours of work will be deducted from Defendants' 
claim for fees. 
2. Apportionment of Contract and Non-Contract Issues. Defendants acknowledge that 
Plaintiffs complaint brought several causes of action against them, including "contractual and non-
contractual claims." Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have not separated "compensable and non-
compensable claims" sufficiently to allow the Court to award them their attorneys fees. Defendants 
2I assume this is the well-known abbreviation for "Information Technology; 
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argue that all of Plaintiffs claims involved the same set of facts, and that argument is factually 
correct All of Plaintiffs claims were based on the Listing Agreement and on theories of liability 
which depended on the Listing Agreement. For example, Plaintiff could not claim any defendant 
had a fiduciary duty to him independent of the fact that he had accepted the Listing Agreement. 
Similarly, Plaintiff could not make a claim based on an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing without having the Listing Agreement into which such covenant could be implied. 
Plaintiffs causes of action were simply different theories of recovery based on the same set of facts. 
Under these circumstances, Defendants are not required to account separately for the time spent by 
each often persons on each of Plaintiff s several causes of action over the course of five years of 
litigation. 
3, Transition Between Law Firms. Defendants' original counsel withdrew at an early 
point in this litigation and was replaced by Defendants* trial counsel. Plaintiff objects to being 
required to pay attorneys' fees incurred in that transition, but he also acknowledges that Defendants' 
records show that they are not making a claim for the time spent by their former counsel "on 
transition related items." Plaintiff simply speculates that Defendants' claims must include some 
duplication of work, or some work on other cases. The Court finds Defendants' records and 
explanations to be sufficient to overcome speculation in this regard. 
4. Summary Judgment Motion. In the course of this litigation, Defendants filed a 
motion for summary judgment which was heard and denied by this Court. Plaintiff asserts that 
Defendants cannot claim attorney fees for a failed motion for summary judgment because 
Defendants did not "prevail" on that motion. The Court finds Plaintiff's argument to be based on 
4 
an excessively narrow concept of the summary judgment process. Summary judgment is an ordinary 
procedure in the litigation of any civil matter and in the preparation of a civil case for trial. Avoiding 
trial by obtaining summary judgment, however, is only one proper objective of a summary judgment 
motion. Such a motion, if done competently, may produce important evidence even if it is denied. 
A summary judgment motion may test the resolve of an opposing party, the party's understanding 
of the legal issues, and the party's command of the facts, regardless of whether it is granted or 
denied.3 A summary judgment motion may reveal facts and issues that were previously unnoticed 
by the moving party and thus be valuable in negotiation and in trial preparation. Accordingly, a 
summary judgment motion that is denied is not necessarily a failure, and failing to "prevail" on a 
summary judgment motion is not properly considered to be a reason to deny attorneys' fees to a party 
who ultimately prevails.4 The real issue is whether the time spent by Defendants on their summary 
judgment motion was reasonable, and the fact that the Court ruled that the issues should go to a jury 
is not evidence that the motion was unreasonable. Having heard the summary judgment motion as 
well as having conducted the jury trial of this case, and having studied summary judgment practice 
for nearly three decades, this Court finds both Defendants' motion and the time spent by their 
counsel on the motion to be reasonable in a case of this magnitude. 
3In my own practice, I considered a summary judgment motion to be an effective 
discovery tool for forcing a recalcitrant opposing party either to produce information or to suffer 
the consequences of stonewalling. 
4Some appellate courts who, due either to (a) limited experience in litigation practice or to 
(b) little or no experience in the trial courts, are apparently unacquainted with the proper uses of 
summary judgment motions make mistakes in this regard when they assume that the only way to 
"prevail" is to win every point in every argument and every motion. 
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5. Mock Trial. Part of Defendants* counsel's preparation for trial involved preparing 
for and conducting a mock trial. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are claiming some $45,6695 for 
fees related to this mock trial and that such claim is unreasonable. Defendants assert that they 
already wrote off some fees related to the mock trial and that the fees for the day of the trial were 
only $2066.37.6 Regardless of the obvious utility of a mock trial in preparation for any jury trial 
involving difficult issues, it is not usual or typical in this Court's experience for a prevailing party 
to claim fees for having prepared in this manner. The trial in this case was superbly conducted by 
both sides, however, with Defendants prevailing in the jury's verdict. The unusually high intensity 
of the conflict between the parties and the large amount in controversy justified—even 
necessitated—more than usual trial preparation. I have presided over many jury trials which would 
have been improved by better preparation, including perhaps a mock trial, because preparation for 
a mock trial would also improve preparation for jury trial. I find that the mock trial used by 
Defendants' counsel to prepare in this case clearly aided in their preparation for the long, difficult 
jury trial and was a reasonable investment of time. 
6. Plaintiffs Vigorous Prosecution of Claims. One interesting issue has to do with the 
extent to which Plaintiff employed multiple attorneys in the prosecution of its claims and the 
relevance, if any, of Plaintiffs vigorous prosecution to the reasonableness of Defendants' request 
5PIaintifFs calculation is clearly incorrect, since many time entries which mention "mock 
trial" also mention work unrelated to the mock trial. 
^h i s figure is clearly too limited, because Defendants' counsel's records show more than 
a dozen individual entries relating to "mock trial." 
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for attorneys' fees. As the losing party, PlaintifFhas not been required to disclose its own attorneys' 
hours and charges. Without detailed information from Plaintiff, Defendants noted in their initial 
memorandum that "while the one plaintiff in this case (Gilbert) was primarily represented by three 
attorneys throughout discovery and trial of this matter . . . the five defendants in this case were 
primarily represented by one attorney . . . in discovery, and two attorneys . . . at trial." This 
comparison of "manpower," though factually accurate, apparently struck a nerve with Plaintiff, 
whose response calls the comparison "unhelpful"7 and implies that Plaintiff's own spending on 
attorneys' fees is irrelevant to the reasonableness of Defendants' attorneys fees because it is not a 
Dixie State Bank factor. In their reply memorandum, Defendants' then flesh out their point, referring 
to Plaintiff as "a well-financed and relentless plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel and two 
partners from one of the state's largest and most respected law firms," which Defendants describe 
as "heavy artillery." In both of their memoranda, Defendants note that Plaintiff's Second 
Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures stated that Plaintiff's own attorneys fees for this case totaled 
$275,150 as of May 2006. In the opinion of this Court, it is entirely relevant to observe that, nearly 
two years before trial, Plaintiff had already incurred fees equal to 69% of Defendant's fees for the 
entire litigation through the jury trial. Plaintiff does not argue that either the time spent or the fees 
charged by its own attorneys to vigorously prosecute its claims were unreasonable, and the Court 
finds no fault with Plaintiff in its vigorous prosecution and finds that Plaintiff was very well 
represented. This Court also finds, however, that evidence of Plaintiffs investment of time and 
7Converseiy, however, Plaintiff later argues that some of the work done for Defendants 
was "overstaffed" with attorneys. 
7 
resources in this case is entirely relevant to the question whether it was reasonable for Defendants' 
attorneys to spend significant time and resources to defeat Plaintiffs claims. 
Having reviewed all the information provided by the parties, the Court finds that the time 
spent by Defendants' attorneys was reasonable, except as stated above. 
REASONABLE HOURLY RATE 
Determining a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys' services is an issue on which the appellate 
courts have been unusually vague. The usual statement by an appeUate court is, for example, that 
the rate must be what is "customarily charged in the relevant community." So far as the parties have 
disclosed to this Court, however, no appellate court has disclosed how "the relevant community" is 
to be determined. 
Defendants' attorneys' affidavits recite that some of the attorneys' hourly rates "were 
specifically discounted for this action" and that all hourly rates charged "are consistent with rates 
charged in this locality," without identifying that locality. Plaintiff relies on Utah cases using such 
terms as "other local attorneys' rates" and "in the locality" and assumes that this means the city in 
which this Court is located. Accordingly, Plaintiff concludes that the only reasonable hourly rates 
for litigation in this "locality" are those charged by attorneys whose offices are located in St. George, 
Utah—even though Plaintiffs two primary attorneys do not have their offices in that "locality."8 
Defendants' reply memorandum identifies the logical fallacy in Plaintiffs argument: If "the 
8Fortunately for Plaintiffs argument, Plaintiff is not required to explain what its position 
would be if it had been the prevailing party and it were seeking, as it has during this entire case, 
an award of the attorneys' fees it has paid to Salt Lake City counsel. 
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locality" in which attorneys' hourly rates are relevant and limiting is strictly the location of this 
Court, then a prevailing party could never recover its attorneys fees without restricting itself to St. 
George attorneys or attorneys charging St. George rates, regardless of whether the opposing attorneys 
were from St. George. 
This Court does not perceive the appellate courts' vague statements about "locality" and 
"relevant community" to be a basis for concluding that the appellate courts are imposing a "buy 
local" philosophy upon a litigating party's choice of counsel. Instead, it is the opinion of this Court 
that "the locality" to be considered is the general geographic area in which a party litigating in this 
Court might reasonably look for litigation counsel. 
The particular community in which this Court is located, Washington County, is not isolated 
from the rest of Utah, is neither more wealthy nor more economically distressed than the rest of 
Utah, and is not less sophisticated about legal matters than the rest of Utah. Residents of this 
community do not restrict their purchases of goods and services to providers in this community, 
much to the dismay of local providers. The market for legal services in Washington County is 
limited only to attorneys who are licensed to practice in Utah, and this Court considers "the relevant 
community" to be the State of Utah for determining whether Defendants' attorneys' hourly rates are 
reasonable. 
In addition, the Court should consider "the fee customarily charged" for similar services in 
the relevant locality or community. This does not mean that the Court is required to base an award 
on an "average" hourly rate, however. The fee awarded simply must be reasonable in light of all 
circumstances. 
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The circumstances affecting the reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rate include the 
experience and skill of the particular attorneys. All but one of the attorneys participating in this case 
(the exception being Plaintiffs in-house counsel who, too, is highly competent) are from some of 
the premier law firms in Utah: (a) Plaintiffs litigation attorneys are from Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; 
(b) Plaintiffs attorneys on this issue are from Durham, Jones & Pinegar; (c) Defendants' attorneys 
are from Sneil &Wilmer; and (d) Defendants' former attorneys were from Jones, Waldo, Holbrook 
& McDonough. In the trial and all matters brought before the Court, the work done by all attorneys 
has been exemplary. The focus, of course, is now on Defendants' attorneys, and the Court observed 
that their lead attorney, Mr. Lalli, was especially well prepared, professional, skillful, expert, and 
effective in this case. 
Having reviewed all the information provided by the parties, the Court finds no reason to 
believe that the rates charged by Defendants' attorneys are unreasonable. 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Having fully reviewed the evidence, the Court finds that the work outlined by Defendants' 
attorneys was actually done by them,9 that the work was reasonably necessary to present a completely 
successful defense against Plaintiffs several claims, and that the billing rates shown by Defendants' 
attorneys are consistent with the rates customarily charged by Utah attorneys with the experience and 
skill of those who defended in this case. The Court finds that this case was somewhat unusual in its 
factual and legal complexity and that Plaintiffs vigor in pursuing its case, though entirely 
9With the one exception for IT Department work, which is excluded. 
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appropriate, made a vigorous defense necessary. The Court concludes that Defendants' Request for 
Attorneys' Fees should be granted, with the exception noted above, so that the total award is 
$397,911.00. 
BILL OF COSTS 
Defendants' Bill of Costs explains their claim for a total of $82,942.89 in costs incurred by 
them in this litigation, which the supporting affidavits describe as "necessary and reasonable." 
Plaintiff objects to several of the claims or amounts. 
Plaintiff asserts that the $49,943.00 in costs related to Defendants' mock trial are not shown 
to have been reasonable. The Court has rejected Plaintiffs argument against Defendants' attorneys 
fees claim related to the mock trial, but the Court finds the costs to be a different matter. Time spent 
by attorneys for the prevailing party in preparation for trial, including study, research and training, 
should be awarded if the time and effort are reasonable and related to the case. If all costs of doing 
relevant study or research and of obtaining relevant training were automatically chargeable to the 
losing party, however, it might even be said that those costs include law school tuition and library 
acquisitions. The costs that Defendants claim in relation to the mock trial include consultant fees, 
travel, site rental, and recruiting and paying mock jurors. There is no evidence before the Court to 
show that such costs were reasonable, except a blanket assertion in Mr. Lalli's affidavit. Without 
evidence showing that such costs were in fact reasonable—e.g., as opposed to conducting a mock 
trial at one's own offices with volunteer jurors—the Court cannot find these costs to be reasonable. 
Accordingly, the costs awarded will not include the costs of the mock trial. 
Plaintiff also objects to Defendants' claim of $8467,09 for copying and document 
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reproduction costs. The only charges shown to be directly related to prevailing in this case are for 
"Preparation of Trial Exhibits" in the amount of $1596.66. The Court finds that all other claims in 
this category are the usual overhead of a law firm that is covered by attorneys' fees and not the sort 
of costs that are necessary to prevailing in litigation. 
Plaintiff objects to the costs claimed for Defendants' expert, David Johnson. Contrary to 
Plaintiffs characterization of Mr. Johnson's importance to the case, the Court finds that Mr. 
Johnson's advice to Defendants' and his testimony at trial were sufficiently necessary to Defendants' 
success that a reasonable fee should be assessed against Plaintiff. The invoices attached to the Bill 
of Costs, however, total only $4670.75, and the remainder of this claim is undocumented. 
Plaintiff challenges Defendants' claims for the costs of "travel and communications." The 
Court finds charges for telephones, faxes and postage to be normal overhead expenses like routine 
photocopies. Reasonable travel costs are an ordinary expense of litigation, however, and may be 
awarded to a prevailing party. The total awarded in this case is $6216.03. 
Finally, Plaintiff objects to being charged with $429.45 for the costs of depositions, because 
deposition transcripts were not employed at trial. Depositions costs are routinely incurred in trial 
preparation, however, regardless of whether they are used at trial. In addition, it appears that the two 
depositions involved in Defendants' claim were taken upon notices given by Plaintiff, so Plaintiff 
can hardly argue that it was not necessary for Defendants' to incur these costs. 
AWARD OF COSTS 
Having reviewed all of the evidence before the Court on the subject, the Court finds the 
following costs to be reasonable and, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
12 
and Section 8 of the parties' Listing Agreement, awards the total of such costs to Defendants as costs 
of this litigation: 











The Court awards attorneys' fees and costs to Defendants and against Plaintiff in the amounts 
of $397,911.00 for fees and $12,912.89 for costs, and judgment may be entered for the total of 
$410,823.89. Defendants' counsel may submit an appropriate judgment. 
Dated this 1*5 day of February, 2009. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 1^ dayofcfti? _, 2009,1 provided true and correct copies 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER to each of the attorneys/parties named 
below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse 
in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
and addressed as follows: 
Bryan J. Pattison 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Thomas J. Burns 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael W. Spence 
Mark W. Pugsley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
36 South State Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Cyndi W. Gilbert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 190 
Toquerville, Utah 84774 
Matthew L. Lalli 
James D. Gardner 
Attorneys for Wardley defendants 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
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SPECIAL VERDICT FOR^d 
Case No. 030501128 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If 
you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If 
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance 
of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue 
presented, answer "No." 
1. Do you find by a preponderance of evidence that Gilbert Development 
Corporation ("GDC") imposed, under the terms of any agreement, in sufficiently definite 
terms a condition that GDC would not seller-finance the sale of Zion View Estates 
("ZVE") to anyone if Dave Wright or a manufactured housing company were involved in 
the transaction in any way, shape or form? 
YES I NO z 
If your answer is No to question 1, sign this form at the bottom and notify the 
clerk. If you answered Yes, go to question 2. 
2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that David Wright or a 
manufactured housing company was involved in the seller-financed transaction between 
GDC and Henry Butterfield? 
YES NO 
If you answered No, sign this form at the bottom and notify the clerk. If you 
answered Yes, go to question 3. 
3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that David Wright's or a 
manufactured housing company's involvement, if any, was sufficiently material to the 
seller-financed transaction between GDC and Henry Butterfield to impose either (1) a 
contractual duty, (2) a fiduciary duty, or (3) a duty under the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing on any of the defendants to disclose such involvement to GDC? 
YES NO 
If you answered No, sign this form at the bottom and notify the clerk. If you 
answered Yes, go to question 4. 
4. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that any defendant knew 
that David Wright or a manufactured housing company was involved in the seller-













If you answered No for all defendants, sign this form at the bottom and notify the 
clerk. If you answered Yes for one or more defendants, answer question 5 with respect to 
each such defendant only. 
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5. With respect to each defendant to which you answered "Yes" in question 
4, do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that such defendant(s) breached a 
contractual, fiduciary or other duty to inform GDC of David Wright or a manufactured 
housing company's involvement in the seller-financed transaction between GDC and 
Henry Butterfield? 
TERRY LOCICERO Yes No 
DON GRYMES Yes No 
LLOYD MELLING Yes No 
CHAD RIDDLE Yes No 
If you answered No for all defendants, sign this form at the bottom and notify the 
clerk. If you answered Yes for one or more defendants, answer question 6 with respect to 
each such defendant only. 
6. With respect to each defendant to which you answered "Yes" in question 
5, do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that any defendant's failure to inform 
GDC of Dave Wright or a manufactured housing company's involvement in the seller-
financed transaction between GDC and Henry Butterfield proximately caused GDC to 
suffer any loss? 
TERRY LoCICERO Yes No 
DON GRYMES Yes No 
LLOYD MELLING Yes No 
CHAD RIDDLE Yes No 
If you answered No for all defendants, sign this form at the bottom and notify the 
clerk. If you answered Yes for one or more defendants, answer question 7. 
7. What amount of damages, if any, will reasonably and fairly compensate 
GDC for loss proximately caused by any defendant's failure to inform GDC of Dave 
Wright or a manufactured housing company's involvement in the seller-financed 




If you answered with a number greater than zero, go to question 8. If you 
answered zero, sign this form at the bottom and notify the clerk. 
8. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Wardley Better 













DATED t h i s ^ - ^ £ # day of March, 2008. 
4 
8666292 
